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Sexual Rights and their Discontents:        
Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī  on Homosexuality and            
the ‘Islamic Family’  *
BETTINA DENNERLEIN (Universität Zürich) 
Abstract 
Taking Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī as an example, this article suggests looking at neo-conservative Islamic dis-
course on homosexuality in connection with the enduring vehemence with which this discourse upholds 
religiously framed notions of marriage and the family while continuously making adaptations on questions 
of women’s rights in order to accommodate political and societal change. In his writings, al-Qaraḍāwī 
systematically treats the topic of homosexuality in connection with the central theme of his programme of 
wasaṭiyya gravitating around the legitimate ‘Islamic’ family which actually proves to be a hybrid of nation-
al state sanctioned familism and a decontextualised ideal of sexual difference as an eternal ‘cosmic’ princi-
ple. While contributing itself to their politicisation, Islamic discourse constructs both family and sexuality 
as lying beyond the reach of (secular) politics. Naturalised and sacralised notions of marriage and sexuality 
thereby warrant a realm for religious authority to rise to legitimately speak in public. So far, research on 
homosexuality and Islam has largely focused on religious and juridical qualifications as well as on ques-
tions of categorisation. The main argument presented here is that the ideological zeal in Islamic discourse 
on the topic is always also more basically directed against any attempt at transferring the language of (secu-
lar) rights to issues of gender and sexuality. 
 
Key words: heteronormativity, Islamic discourse, homosexuality, sexual rights, Islamic normativity. 
1.  Introduction 
Taking Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī as an example, this article suggests looking at neo-conservative 
Islamic discourse on homosexuality in connection with the enduring vehemence with 
which this discourse upholds religiously framed notions of marriage and the family while 
continuously making adaptations on questions of women’s rights in order to accommodate 
political and societal change. Given al-Qaraḍāwī’s ideological proximity to the Egyptian 
Muslim Brotherhood and his local influence up to 2011, I will contextualise his positions 
mainly with reference to Egyptian politics of gender and women’s rights. So far, research 
on homosexuality and Islam has largely focused on religious and juridical qualifications as 
                                                 
*  Parts of the ideas and material expounded in this article have been presented at different conferences at 
the University of Zurich (The Surgical Reconstruction of Sex, June 2013; Contesting Fertilities, Fami-
lies, and Sexualities, September 2013) and at Humboldt University, Berlin (The Homophobic Argu-
ment, June 2014). I have read and discussed several of the texts analysed here in my seminars at Zurich 
University and would like to thank the students for their stimulating questions and comments. I am par-
ticularly grateful to Marnia Lazreg, who took the time to read a version of this text, as well as to the 
anonymous reviewers for their helpful remarks and suggestions. 
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well as on questions of categorisation.1 Complementing this research, the main argument 
presented here is that the ideological zeal in Islamic discourse on the topic is always also 
more basically directed against any attempt at transferring the language of (secular) rights 
to issues of gender and sexuality.  
In Egypt, as in other countries of the Arab region, the by now hegemonic understanding 
of the family as the basic unit of state and society and as the core institution of a nationally 
defined and planned ‘reproductive arena’,2 constitutes the object of conflicting interpreta-
tions and ideologies.3 Since independence, authoritarian regimes have made political use of 
women’s and gender issues, putting competing oppositional forces against each other—
among others, in the case of women’s rights movements and Islamic forces. On the institu-
tional level, Islamic Personal Status Law as it has evolved in Egypt since the 1920s has 
enshrined the hegemony of religious normativity over the private sphere in the framework 
of the modern secular nation state. At the same time, since the turn of the 19th to the 20th 
century Islamic reformist discourse has not only contributed to the more general trend of 
institutionalising marriage, it has also been crucial in sexualising marriage, with sexuality 
being conceived of as a natural human condition in need of moral as well sanitary regula-
tion.4 The fusion of religion with naturalised notions of marriage and heteronormative 
sexuality that has thus emerged until today serves as a powerful tool for articulating Islamic 
opposition to women’s human rights inside the family or, more recently, opposition to 
‘gender feminism’.5 At the same time, it precludes any accommodation with and even more 
so any form of recognition of sexual orientation as a basis for rights claims—independently 
of more explicitly homophobic attitudes and the question whether homosexuality is inter-
preted as inherently natural or as a question of choice. A telling symptom of the complex 
dynamics at stake here is the position expressed by the influential Egyptian intellectual, 
Muḥammad ʿImāra, a crucial figure for guiding the reception of modernist Islamic thought 
in the Arab-speaking world, on radical feminism leading to the propagation of homosexual-
ity.6  
The issues of homosexuality and of homophobia in Muslim societies are most of the 
time discussed in relation to the growing visibility of transnational LGBTQIA (Lesbian, 
Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer, Intersex, Asexual) activism. Often, contemporary 
repressive attitudes in the region are seen to contrast with supposedly more fluid pre-
modern cultures of sexuality.7 An important line of research therefore concentrates on the 
                                                 
1  See for example the meticulous study of contemporary debates on homosexuality and Islam in TOLINO 
2014; TOLINO 2016. 
2  CONNELL 2005: 71. 
3  On the widely shared hegemonic or ‘national family’ in the Arab World see HASSO 2011. 
4  On ideological familism and the institutionalisation of marriage in modern Egypt, see CUNO 2015 and 
KHOULOUSSY 2010. On the fusion of Islamic arguments with contemporary European evolutionary 
theories see EL SHAKRY 2015. On efforts at regulating sexuality and reproduction, see ALI 2002 and 
EL SHAKRY 2007. On notions of sexuality as such, see MASSAD 2007.  
5  On this issue, see a recent statement by Hiba Raʾūf ʿIzzat on the internet platform islamonline.net from 
30 April 2013: <https://islamonline.net/3796> (accessed 28 June 2017). 
6  For a short extract from a TV appearance with English subtitles see <http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/ 
967.htm>. 
7  See BAUER 2013. See also BAUER 2011. 
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introduction and evolution of modern notions of sexual perversion and homosexuality as 
deviating from normalised heterosexuality.8 Another major research focus is on emerging 
marginal or non-normative sexual identities at the intersection of local socio-cultural vo-
cabularies and the language of international gay rights activism.9 In this literature, Islamism 
and/or conservative Islam are seen to be key factors, while the political stakes involved are 
less discussed. What do conservative Islamic forces do when they define social problems in 
terms of moral decadence, the break-up of gender norms and, more particularly, the break-
up of sexual mores? And why are heteronormative marriage and the family so central to 
any definition of an authentically Islamic as well as natural order to be protected against 
current perils of disintegration and cultural Westernisation? 
The reading of al-Qaraḍāwī suggested here attempts to show how naturalised and sa-
cralised notions of marriage and sexuality are linked to the political history of the region as 
well as to the intellectual trajectories of modern and contemporary Islamic thought. It com-
bines approaches from sexuality studies with women’s and gender studies. In a first sec-
tion, I briefly discuss relevant research on homosexuality in the MENA (Middle East and 
North Africa) region. A second section, containing the core of the argument, starts by look-
ing more closely at marriage and sexuality as strategic sites for gendered as well as gender-
ing processes of state and nation building in the Arab region since the late 19th century. The 
creation of Islamic Personal Status Law is a case in point here, instituting the interlocking 
of the private-public divide with the definition of a sphere for Islamic law to make its ‘pub-
lic appearance through state law’.10 This situation turns the family into an anchor point for 
politicising Islam with the help of the family and vice versa while rhetorically de-polit-
icising both. At the same time, the idea of the conjugal family as a realm of personal liberty 
and autonomy has allowed for the blending of liberal ideas with Islamic moral standards.11 
The last part of the paper presents a close reading of selected texts by al-Qaraḍāwī in order 
to illustrate how the firm separation of sexuality from rights—be it individual or collective 
(i.e. minority) rights based on gender or sexual orientation/identity—operates in Islamic 
discourse. It will be argued that al-Qaraḍāwī’s programmatically anti-homosexual stance 
serves to protect the family and sexuality from secular notions of rights on the one hand 
and from liberal Muslim critique on the other. 
2. Framing Homosexuality and Islam 
Research on sexuality in Arabic-Islamic societies began as part of academic Orientalism. A 
typical case in point is Georges Henry Bousquet’s L’éthique sexuelle de l’Islam, published 
in 1953. Bousquet’s general focus was Islam’s assumed lack of concern for marriage as a 
stable moral and social institution. From the start, the author stresses the difference be-
tween ‘our’ understanding of marriage and Islam:  
                                                 
  8  NAJMABADI 2005; EL ROUAYHEB 2005; ZE’EVI 2006. 
  9  AHMED-GHOSH 2012; HABIB 2010; KUGLE 2010; MURRAY & ROSCOE 1997; RAHMAN 2014. 
10  ASAD 2003: 231. 
11  MCLARNEY 2015: esp. 33-102. 
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Le ‘mariage’ en langue arabe, se dit nikâh', c’est-à-dire ‘coït’. Sans attacher à ces 
sortes d’arguments philologiques plus d’importance qu’ils n’en ont, il faut 
prononcer que cela donne bien l’essentiel de la conception islamique de cette 
institution. Nous continuerons à user du terme ‘mariage’, mais je me demande s’il 
n’yaurait pas intérêt à conserver le mot arabe comme terme technique pour désigner 
une chose qui, certes, a des rapports avec notre mariage, mais aussi en diffère 
considérablement.12  
Since the 1970s, connected to the critique of both Orientalism and emerging conservative 
religious forces in the region, scholars from the Arab region have suggested novel readings 
of Islamic literary as well as normative sources on gender, the body and sexuality.13 Not-
withstanding significant differences between them in terms of discipline, sources and 
methodology, they were all concerned with demonstrating the richness and diversity of 
Islamic representations of sexuality in contrast to Western traditions as well as in contrast 
to contemporary conservative trends in Islam. More recently, Thomas Bauer has further 
developed this line of thought applying the concept of a ‘culture of ambiguity’ to pre-
modern Islamic history in general.14  
Since the 1990s, sexuality studies have gained new impetus from developments in gay 
and lesbian studies as well as from queer theory. Homosexuality now became a major top-
ic—leading for the first time to an area studies version of the constructivism vs essential-
ism debate.15 Over the last two and a half decades, an impressively rich scientific literature 
has developed that historicises and contextualises same-sex sexuality and desire in different 
regional and periodical settings mainly based on literary and normative sources as well as 
on Islamicate science (i.e. philosophy, astronomy, medicine etc.). Researching the entan-
gled history of modern representations of sexual desire in the Arab world, Joseph Massad 
has provided important new insights into major shifts in how secular as well as Islamic 
intellectuals conceived of sexuality as a natural phenomenon and a psychological fact.16 
Massad, as others, puts major emphasis on the contemporary emergence of gay or queer 
identities connected to transnational gender activism and its effects in the region. He push-
es his critique of what he calls the Gay International to completely deprecate it—which in 
turn has raised strong opposition, not least from activist quarters in the Arab region.17 Other 
studies contextualise the different strategies and forms of activism employed on the ground 
to critically examine and assess their impact.18 Sahar Amer programmatically pleads for 
recognising the hybridity and interculturality of Arab LGBTQIA communities and identi-
ties: 
                                                 
12  BOUSQUET 1953: 79. 
13  Important works to be mentioned in this context are MERNISSI 1975; BOUHDIBA 1975; CHEBEL 1984, 
as well as MALTI-DOUGLAS 1991. 
14  BAUER 2011. 
15  For a very helpful overview of relevant debates see TOLINO 2014. 
16  MASSAD 2007: esp. 51-159. 
17  See the reaction of a founding member of Helem to an interview with Joseph Massad on the website 
ResetDOC: <http://www.resetdoc.org/story/00000001542> (last visited 26 December 2017). 
18  See, for example, Nadine Naber’s and Zeina Zaatari’s analysis of feminist and LGBTQ activism during 
the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 2006. NABER & ZAATARI 2014. 
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The question that I am raising here is not whether naming should take place (I 
strongly believe that it must), or even whether Western discourses on sexuality are 
relevant to the Arab world (I firmly believe that they are relevant). Rather, what I in-
terrogate is the almost exclusive reliance by Arab activists on Western terminology 
and Western paradigms of same-sex sexuality. What I object to are the kinds of 
names that are selected by Arab gay activists to speak about homosexuality, and 
how these names fail to empower and delay much-needed social change in Arab so-
cieties today. By adopting foreign terms and gender categories that mimic Western 
sexual politics and by dressing sexual preference in foreign linguistic garb, Arab 
gay activists unwittingly end up supporting a culture of shame that ultimately un-
dermines Arab identity and leads to the further isolation of Arab gays and lesbians 
from their own socio-historical and literary traditions.19  
In the quarrel over specifying sexually defined identities and subjectivities, Amer suggests 
engaging with the necessarily hyphenated character of Arab LGBTQIA communities that 
are both anchored in local traditions and ‘interdependent with global realities’.20 
The focus on cultural and intellectual history as well as on questions of identity and 
subjectivity in research on homosexuality can be seen to supplement Middle East wom-
en’s and gender studies that privilege structural factors determining gender relations such 
as law, politics, and the state as well as socially constructed forms of agency.21 In re-
verse, studies on homosexuality seem to sometimes underestimate the role played by 
secular regimes and state law. In her introduction to a special issue of the Journal of 
Lesbian Studies on the topic of ‘Lesbians, Sexuality and Islam’, Huma Ahmed-Ghosh 
writes:  
For Muslim communities, especially in recent decades, the politicization of ‘con-
servative’ Islam has pointedly impacted same-sex relationships through the impo-
sition of strict ‘Islamic’ moral codes. By labeling alternative sexualities as ‘devi-
ant’, oft quoted verses (mentioned in these articles) from the Quran have been 
used to legitimize these fatwas and policing of people’s sexuality.22  
The author further argues that ‘sexuality was historically viewed as “fluid”, with rare 
public strictures’.23 Today, on the contrary, ‘we are seeing harsh laws dictated by con-
servative Islamic regimes and courts challenging this sexual fluidity and replacing it with 
harsher sentences to ensure heterosexual conformity’.24 Likewise, Muslim gay activists, 
when engaging with the critique of religious conservatism in the name of liberal or pro-
gressive Islam likewise contribute to putting Islam at the center of the debate on homo-
phobia.25 In what follows, I suggest looking more closely at the historical, legal and po-
                                                 
19  AMER 2012: 387ff. 
20  Ibid.: 391. 
21  For a concise and well documented overview see CHARRAD 2011; see also DENNERLEIN 2016. 
22  AHMED-GHOSH 2012: 377. 
23  Ibid.: 387. 
24  Ibid. 
25  See for example KUGLE 2010 and 2014. 
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litical underpinnings of Islamic framings of heteronormativity and their impact on argu-
ments about homosexuality. 
3. Family and sexuality in Islamic Personal Status Law 
Since the late 19th century, the realm of law comprising marriage, the family and inher-
itance started to be conceived as Personal Status Law, subsequently rendered in Arabic as 
aḥwāl šaḫṣiyya.26 During a first phase, Personal Status Law in Egypt as elsewhere in the 
region stayed relatively free from direct Europeanisation. Until the first half of the 20th 
century, legal change was implemented most of the time by way of procedural laws and the 
introduction of basic formal requirements for registering marriages. Yet, at the same time, 
the definition of marriage and the family was fundamentally transformed in religious re-
formist as well as in liberal nationalist discourse. Companionship between the spouses and 
mutual solidarity came to be considered basic elements of marriage as the basis of a stable 
and healthy family.27 One of the major functions of the new family was the production of 
self-regulated and well-educated children as valuable future members of the national com-
munity. The conceptual shift that elevated the conjugal family to an essentially national and 
civilisational concern enhanced the role of women as wives and mothers. Female educa-
tion, domesticity and the cultivation of women’s inner qualities now became a chief appre-
hension of—male as well as female—proponents of social and moral reform.28 Giving birth 
and raising children was considered a publicly relevant matter that necessitated new 
measures of control and discipline.29 Very much in line with contemporary European ideas, 
motherhood and female domesticity were interpreted as the fulfillment of women’s natural 
temperament. In addition to endeavors that aimed at the ‘policing of families’,30 the modern 
conjugal family was turned into a privileged site of affective bonds of love and intimacy 
that were legally recognised, socially accepted as well as morally and culturally valued. 
Targeted educational and health campaigns, the media as well as popular culture more 
generally concurred to establish the conjugal family in opposition to ‘traditional’ or ‘infor-
mal’ familial settings not only as a normative model but also as desirable and conducive to 
happiness.31  
Islamic Personal Status Law constituted an intrinsic part of processes of state building 
and nation building. In response to colonial modernity, women and the family became 
important sites for the defense of national as well as religious authenticity. The modern 
                                                 
26  CUNO 2015: esp. 164 ff.; DENNERLEIN 1998. 
27  For medical and biopolitical discourses on the family in inter-war Egypt see EL SHAKRY 2007: esp. 
165-194. 
28  See for example AHMED 1992; BARON 1994; BADRAN 1995. 
29  EL SHAKRY 1998. 
30  DONZELOT 2005. 
31  ABU-LUGHOD 2005; ALI 2002; HASSO 2011; KHOULOUSSY 2010; KREIL 2011. Equally, the Arab 
Human Development Report of 2009 continuously refers to the ‘good’ family as opposed to the rather 
dysfunctional ‘traditional’ or ‘patriarchal’ family (for the complete text of the report see: <http://www. 
arab-hdr.org/contents/index.aspx?rid=5>). 
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family opened up new possibilities for negotiating political loyalties and identities.32 In 
public debates as well as in legal discourse—again very much echoing European ideas—
marriage and the family were increasingly seen to be natural as well as sacred phenomena 
lying beyond the reach of secular law and policy making.33 During the inter-war period, 
Egyptian jurists and legislators started to classify aḥwāl šaḫṣiyya as comprising the ‘natural 
qualities’ of human beings according to the separate ‘system’ (Ar. niẓām) of the family.34 
At the same time, Personal Status Law actually did transform gender relations. The strictly 
hierarchical relationship between the sexes sanctioned by traditional Islamic jurisprudence 
(fiqh) was reinterpreted to be tuned in to national concerns of socio-biological reproduction 
as well as to notions of moral and social progress.35 In contrast to modern Islamic Personal 
Status Law, traditional Islamic law had conceived of marriage as a strictly private bilateral 
or synallagmatic contract (muʿāwaḍa). According to its technically legal definition in Sunni 
fiqh, the effect of a validly-contracted marriage was to establish legitimate sexual relations 
between a man and a free woman (as opposed to a female slave) thus safeguarding legiti-
mate off-spring and controlling the transmission of wealth. Upon marriage, the husband 
acquired the exclusive right to sexual intercourse with his wife and to control of her person, 
whereas she acquired property of the dowry and the right to marital maintenance.36 In prin-
ciple, the dissolution of marriage was just as much a purely private act as its contracting. 
This is especially true for the unilateral dissolution of marriage on the husband’s initiative, 
or repudiation (ṭalāq).  
This perception clearly differs from the nationalist-reformist reformulation of marriage 
and the conjugal family. Supported by state-sanctioned ideological and legal familism, the 
institutionalisation of Islamic Personal Status Law in the framework of the modern secular 
state created a specific institutional formula linking the realm of the private or personal 
sphere to religious authority.  
It is because the legal formation of the family gives the concept of individual moral-
ity its own ‘private’ locus that the shariʿa can now be spoken of as ‘the law of per-
sonal status’—qanun al-ahwal al-shakhsiyya. In this way, it becomes the expression 
of a secular formula, defining a place in which ‘religion’ is allowed to make its pub-
lic appearance through state law. And the family as concept, word, and organiza-
tional unit acquires new salience.37  
Islamic Personal Status Law institutionally and programmatically fused religion, gender 
and the family.38 The issues of ‘woman’ and ‘family’ became sacralised as a result of the 
political construction of both, the secular (or the non-religious) and the religious ‘as dis-
                                                 
32  BOOTH 1998. See also CHARRAD 2001; JOSEPH 2000; KANDIYOTI 1991. 
33  For quite similar interpretations of family law in the context of the early Federal Republic of Germany 
see WESEL 1998: 72. 
34  KAŠBŪR 1993: 5 ff.  
35  CUNO 2015: 77-122; EL SHAKRY 2007: 165 ff. 
36  For a comprehensive study of the historico-legal context of traditional Islamic conceptions of marriage 
and sexuality see ALI 2006; ALI 2008. 
37  ASAD 2003: 231. 
38  For a comparative perspective on this phenomenon see CADY & FESSENDEN 2013b: 3-24. 
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crete conceptual categories’ enmeshed with the highly gendered separation of public and 
private spheres.39 ‘“The woman” and “the family” were the last domain left to the religious, 
over which they were in principle free to rule’.40 At the same time, ‘woman’ and ‘family’ 
were turned into sites of ideological competition.  
Confining shariʿa to domestic matters politicized the family both as a sphere of in-
timate, affective relations and as a repository of group identity of which religious af-
filiation was a defining legal and moral characteristic. (…) Languages of privacy 
that entered the legal discourse around personal status matters concurrently with the 
limiting of the shariʿa’s jurisdiction served to create ‘the family’ both as a private 
space and one which was central to political order.41  
While for secular women’s rights activists, Personal Status Law turned out to be difficult to 
directly challenge due to its being linked to the realm of religion, religious forces politi-
cised the family turning it into a model for a liberated as well as Islamic social and political 
order.42 Based on her study on female voices of the religious awakening in Egypt since the 
1970s, Ellen McLarney shows how the Egyptian Islamic intellectual and activist Hiba 
Raʾūf ʿIzzat by claiming a political role for women inside the family, questions both the de-
politicisation of the family as well as the privatisation of religion.43 Only more recently, 
resulting from the institutionalisation of human rights since the beginning of the new mil-
lennium, secular women’s rights activists in Egypt as elsewhere in the Arab region have 
gained new grounds for criticising Personal Status Law while at the same time risking more 
than ever to be considered allies of authoritarian regimes and international donors.44 
4. Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī and his interlocutors 
Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī, who was born in 1926 in a provincial town in Egypt and lives in Qaṭar 
since the 1960s, can be considered a paradigmatic example of contemporary moderate 
conservative Islamic thought.45 Having been trained at al-Azhar University in Cairo, al-
Qaraḍāwī represents a more particularly scholarly type of religious authority. This distin-
guishes him from Islamic intellectuals with a secular educational background. 46  Al-
Qaraḍāwī’s special ideological brand is best expressed in his own definition of a ‘middle 
                                                 
39  BADRAN 2013: 106. 
40  Ibid.: 107. 
41  BIER 2011: 104. 
42  For the secular women’s rights movement up through the 1990es see Al-ALI 2009: 154 ff., 165 ff.  
43  MCLARNEY 2015: 219-253. 
44  See FARAG 2017. 
45  See also Zaman’s assessment of al-Qaraḍāwī. ZAMAN 2012: 18 ff. 
46  For a densely documented presentation of his biography and his writings with particular focus on the 
analysis of his opinion on apostasy see KRÄMER 2006. For a comprehensive study of his online pres-
ence see GRÄF 2010. For a study of his contribution to an Islamic law for Muslim minorities in the 
West see ALBRECHT 2010. For a selection of current research on this figure see also GRÄF & SKOV-
GAARD-PETERSON 2009. For an informative general overview see SOAGE 2008. 
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way’ or wasaṭiyya Islam47 demarcated from radical or extremist Islamist positions on the 
one hand, liberal or pro-Western ones on the other hand. Since the first publication in 1960 
of his now classic book al-Ḥalāl wa’l-ḥarām fī ’l-islām (The Lawful and the Prohibited in 
Islam), meanwhile reprinted several times and translated into numerous languages, al-
Qaraḍāwī stands for a clearly defined program of Islamic legal guidance in all aspects of 
everyday life. He claims authority for himself to interpret and adapt an all-encompassing 
framework of Islamic normativity based on the recognised canonical sources and estab-
lished methods of interpretation in order to provide guidance for an Islamic conduct of life 
in accordance with contemporary needs. He bases this claim on his profound knowledge of 
Islamic law (fiqh) as well as his acquaintance with the complexities of present-day life. Key 
terms in this context are the notions of realism or pragmatism (wāqiʿiyya, maydāniyya) as 
well as of alleviation (taysīr) he uses to describe the basic nature of Islamic law.48 Al-
Qaraḍāwī’s political opinions on Islam and democracy are considered ambivalent—
particularly when it comes to sensitive issues like apostasy or the political rights of women 
and non-Muslims under Islamic law.49 Nevertheless, al-Qaraḍāwī’s role as a reference for 
radical Islamist groups who started to distance themselves from the use of violence since 
the 1990s and especially his rapid and unambiguous condemnation of the terrorist attacks 
of September 11, 2001, earned al-Qaraḍāwī the reputation of being a moderate.  
In spite of his biographical links and ideological closeness to al-Azhar University in 
Cairo on the one hand, to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood on the other hand, and in spite 
of his prominent role in several international Islamic organisations, al-Qaraḍāwī stages 
himself primarily as an independent and self-sufficient religious authority.50 Al-Qaraḍāwī’s 
public visibility and his presumed influence are mainly based on the abundant number of 
his writings as well as his statements and fatwas that are widely distributed via the internet 
on islamonline.net or qaradawi.net. In addition, al-Qaraḍāwī used to be a frequent guest on 
television—especially on Al Jazeera, where he was regularly invited to the program al-
Šarīʿa wa’l-ḥayāh (Sharia and Life) during the years 1996 to 2013.51  
As far as the topics of gender, the family and sexuality are concerned, al-Qaraḍāwī on 
first view holds rather conventional conservative positions such as those aptly summarised 
by Yvonne Haddad in her study on Islamist literature on women up to the 1990s:  
This literature tends to project women as endowed with a special mystique of do-
mesticity interpreted as an essential part of God’s plan for humanity, a religious du-
ty. (…) The home is the domain of women; the man is her protector.52  
                                                 
47  For more details on this concept see Paola PIZZO’s contribution in this special dossier, pp. 156 ff.  
48  See KRÄMER 2006: 197-200. 
49  See KRÄMER 2006 and 2011, as well as EUBEN & ZAMAN 2009b. 
50  KRÄMER 2006: 193. Among others, al-Qaraḍāwī is a member of the Fiqh-Council of the Muslim World 
League (MWL) based in Mecca, President of the European Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR) 
based in Dublin and founding president of the International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS) based 
in Qatar. 
51  For an archive of the emissions of this program since 1998 see the program’s website, <http://www. 
aljazeera.net/program/religionandlife>. 
52  HADDAD 1998: 5. 
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Qaraḍāwī wholly endorses the modern notion of the conjugal family as the basic unit of 
society and the state.53 In his early book The Lawful and the Prohibited in Islam mentioned 
above, al-Qaraḍāwī defines gender primarily as being based on marriage and the family.  
Qaraḍāwī’s approach in this publication is pretty straightforward: he has written a 
traditionalist text that emphasizes women’s obligation to safeguard social morality 
through circumspect demeanor in public and obedient behavior in their male-
dominated families.54 
However, over the years, having had to accept certain adaptations in women’s roles to 
accommodate ongoing socio-economic and political changes—like female salaried work, 
the increase of female headed households or the political participation of women not least 
in Islamic parties—al-Qaraḍāwī all the more strictly upholds gender hierarchy or qiwāma 
(male superiority justified with reference to Quran 4:34)55 and the complementarity of the 
sexes as expressions of sacredly as well as naturally ordained principles detached from its 
traditionally patriarchal context of support and protection.56 For this purpose, heteronorma-
tive conjugal generativity is foregrounded as a gendering trope that immunises marriage 
and the family against secular as well as liberal Muslim critique. 
A telling illustration of this is a booklet by al-Qaraḍāwī on the topic of ‘The family as 
wished-for by Islam’ (al-Usra kamā yurīduhā al-islām) published in 2005.57 This booklet 
is based on two papers delivered by al-Qaraḍāwī at the 2004 Doha International Confer-
ence on the Family that has been organised on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the 
UN year of the family.58 The Doha Conference can be considered a forum of religious and 
other conservative forces that focus on the ‘defense’ or ‘protection’ of the family in opposi-
tion to transnational feminist activism and the institutionalisation of transnational women’s 
rights in the aftermath of the Cairo Conference on Population and Development (1994) and 
the following UN-Conferences on women that took place in Beijing (1995) and New York 
(2000). It is concomitant with a broader strategy involving US based organisations such as 
the World Family Policy Center or the Family Research Council who refer to article 16 
paragraph three of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that guarantees protection of 
the family as the ‘natural and fundamental group unity of society’ in order to claim the 
                                                 
53  On the overlap between Islamist and more liberal notions of the conjugal family see ABU-LUGHOD 
1998b. 
54  STOWASSER 2009: 185. 
55  Quran 4:34 in English translation by Marmaduke PICKTHAL (from 1930): ‘Men are in charge of wom-
en, because Allah hath made the one of them to excel the other, and because they spend of their proper-
ty (for the support of women). So good women are the obedient, guarding in secret that which Allah 
hath guarded. As for those from whom ye fear rebellion, admonish them and banish them to beds apart, 
and scourge them. Then if they obey you, seek not a way against them. Lo! Allah is ever High, Exalted, 
Great’. 
56  See for example al-QARAḌĀWĪ 2004.  
57  al-QARAḌĀWĪ 2005. 
58  Ibid.: 6. For the official website see <http://www.difi.org.qa/annual-conference/doha-international-
conference-on-the-family/doha-international-conference-on-the-family> (accessed 28 June 2017). 
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respect of ‘family values’ as a human right.59 The same language of international human 
rights allows al-Qaraḍāwī to claim Islam’s particularities (ḫaṣāʾiṣ) as compared to other 
‘religions of the book’ which, according to him, all share the same basic concern for mar-
riage and the family as ‘sacred’ institutions60—an idea completely absent from traditional 
Islamic law. Al-Qaraḍāwī particularly mentions repudiation and polygyny as examples of 
Islam’s specificity. He thereby simultaneously positions himself against a longstanding 
tradition of inner-Muslim critique of these legal institutes. Similar arguments are employed 
when criticising secular women’s rights from an Islamic point of view. Thus, a declaration 
issued in 2013 by the International Union of Islamic Scholars (al-Ittiḥād al-ʿālamī li-
ʿulamāʾ al-muslimīn) headed by al-Qaraḍāwī on the topic of The Convention on the Elimi-
nation of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and UN declarations 
against violence against women, claims recognition of the principle of gender complemen-
tarity in Islamic family law (as opposed to gender equality) in the name of ‘religious diver-
sity’ (al-tanawwuʿ al-dīnī).61  The declaration therefor objects to interpreting legitimate 
gender differences as conducive to (illegitimate) violence against women. As a conse-
quence of this attitude, for instance, the concept of marital rape as a criminal offense is 
axiomatically rejected.  
While constantly referring to Islamic normativity, the model of marriage and the family 
propagated by al-Qaraḍāwī is actually very much modelled after the hegemonic national 
conjugal family briefly outlined above. Marriage and the family are considered by al-
Qaraḍāwī the basic unit of state and society providing for the moral, the social as well as 
the biological reproduction of humankind altogether—having children being declared one 
of the most important aims of marriage. Al-Qaraḍāwī considers the protection of the family 
a religious and a social duty of husband and wife as well as of society at large.62 He even 
declares marriage to be ‘sacred’.63 Besides unfounded divorce, major threats to marriage 
and the family are subsumed by al-Qaraḍāwī under the notion of ‘libertarianism’ (ibāḥiy-
ya).64  This means the following: unregulated abortion, illicit sexual intercourse, extra-
marital children or unmarried mothers, nudism, transnational conventions protecting repro-
ductive and sexual rights and finally, as the most dangerous, homosexuality.65 Al-Qaraḍāwī 
mentions as particularly perilous the public lobbying for the recognition of homosexuality 
(or sexual deviance, šuḏūḏ) and the publicising of homosexual marriage and homosexual 
families. 
According to al-Qaraḍāwī, the spread of homosexuality not only causes epidemics and 
moral disease, but it also leads to the final extinction of the human species. Generativity 
                                                 
59  BOB 2012: esp. 53-56. See article 16, paragraph 3, Universal Declaration of Human Rights: ‘The fami-
ly is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the 
State’. 
60  al-QARAḌĀWĪ 2005: 5-7. 
61  For the complete text of this declaration see <http://iumsonline.org/ar/aboutar/nt-lnhd/s72> (accessed 
28 June 2017). 
62  al-QARAḌĀWĪ 2005: 38. 
63  Ibid.: 5. 
64  Ibid.: 38-46. 
65  For his explanations on sexual deviance (šuḏūḏ) see al-QARAḌĀWĪ 2005: 46-50. 
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actually lies at the core of al-Qaraḍāwī’s argument. It serves to establish an inextricable 
link between gender, nature and religion based on essentialised notions of sexual difference 
as a manifestation of eternal principles. Sexual difference is portrayed by al-Qaraḍāwī as a 
cosmic norm and a divinely ordered state of affairs.66 Sexual reproduction is taken as a 
proof to the fixed natural as well as divine condition of men and women. By linking the 
heteronormative conjugal family to both ‘nature’ and ‘religion’, this definition of sexual 
difference allows al-Qaraḍāwī to claim a privileged voice for Islam in current public de-
bates on the ‘crisis of the family’.67  
In addition to constituting a hierarchical system of complementary rights and duties 
with clearly defined social functions, marriage and the family are also portrayed as leading 
to personal completion. When addressing his readers, al-Qaraḍāwī interpellates the con-
temporary Muslim as someone who looks for happiness and personal fulfilment in accord-
ance with Islamic legal guidance. In order to properly function, according to al-Qaraḍāwī, 
the family has to be based upon companionate marriage.68 Marriage and the family are 
portrayed as a refuge for clearly defined and personally rewarding gender identities with 
motherhood and fatherhood constituting the most gratifying tasks in life.69 Al-Qaraḍāwī 
idiosyncratically and out of any context quotes the famous line written by the Egyptian 
nationalist poet Ḥāfiẓ Ibrāhīm (d. 1932) praising the mother as ‘a school’ (madrasa)  
whose education would lead to the education of the (whole) nation (šaʿb).70 According to 
al-Qaraḍāwī, children have to be considered a divine gift. He underlines the social and 
moral merit of legitimate descent (nasab) based on marriage in contrast to the tragic fate of 
unmarried mothers and illegitimate children.71 Last but not least, al-Qaraḍāwī accepts the 
idea of a natural sexual drive or instinct (ġarīza) that needs to be channeled through mar-
riage. Accordingly, he considers sexual fulfillment for men as well as women in the frame-
work of marriage legitimate—even though, he adds, marriage involves not just the body 
but ‘the whole human being’.72  
According to al-Qaraḍāwī, the true believer expects more from marriage than simply 
sexual satisfaction. To live as true believers, he stresses, both men and women need to be 
instructed on Islamic principles and precepts.73 They should thus be enabled to live up to 
their being responsible for their own conduct. The accountable Muslim subject is an im-
portant component of al-Qaraḍāwī’s definition of marriage and the family. He insists that 
men and women should freely choose their partner after having seen him or her and after 
having talked to him or her in order to make sure that they match on the social, the educa-
tional, the moral and the psychic levels.74 This leads al-Qaraḍāwī to criticise backward 
                                                 
66  Ibid.: 9. 
67  On the notion of family in crisis discourse see HASSO 2011: esp. 61-98. 
68  al-QARAḌĀWĪ 2005: 9-13. 
69  Ibid.: 51 ff. 
70  al-QARAḌĀWĪ 2005: 77. 
71  On unmarried mothers see Ibid.: 62 ff. 
72  Ibid.: 11ff. 
73  Ibid.: 5; 10. 
74  Ibid.: 14-27. 
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‘traditions’ that do not allow women to choose or even to see her partner prior to the con-
clusion of marriage. According to al-Qaraḍāwī, women should be the ‘masters of them-
selves’.75 The modern Muslim subject addressed by al-Qaraḍāwī appears to be very much a 
‘properly gendered moral person’,76 invested with will and virtue rather than simply exter-
nally controlled.77  
Al-Qaraḍāwī’s model of the ‘Islamic’ family fuses the basic characteristics of the mod-
ern national Egyptian family as defined by the secular state with foundationalist references 
to Islamic normativity as well as to naturalised notions of sexual difference. This fusion 
also allows for partial adaptations over time especially with view to women’s salaried work 
and access to political participation.78 Here, the rhetoric of naturalisation and sacralisation 
of gender can be seen to relieve the family’s hierarchical structure from delivering the mor-
al and material rewards of the ‘patriarchal bargain’.79 As a consequence, male superiority is 
immunised against historicising critique.  
This last point also needs to be seen as being linked to the author’s opposition to com-
peting interpretations of Islamic law, especially different versions of Islamic feminism—
even if this term as such is contested in Arab countries.80 Not surprisingly, al-Qaraḍāwī 
strictly refuses female—as opposed to male—readings of Islamic sources in the name of 
the all-embracing project of ‘insāniyya islāmiyya’ (or Islamic humanism). During an emis-
sion of the program al-Šarīʿa wa’l-Ḥayāh broadcasted by Al Jazeera TV on June 15, 2008 
on the topic of “Women in the noble Koran”, al-Qaraḍāwī does not only oppose initiatives 
like the UNESCO conferences on Islamic feminism but categorically dismisses any idea of 
identity based tafsīr or iǧtihād altogether.81 According to him, only formal scholarly cre-
dentials (and especially the necessary linguistic capacity) qualify for authorised interpreta-
tions of religious texts. In order to promote his own brand of wasaṭiyya in the highly com-
petitive field of mediated transnational Islam, al-Qaraḍāwī not only dismisses Islamic Fem-
inism during the emission but also other positions labelled by him ‘extremist’—notably 
those who declare women’s voice as ʿawra and request the complete exclusion of women 
from the public sphere.  
When it comes to reproductive and sexual rights, al-Qaraḍāwī, again in line with offi-
cial Egyptian politics, has equally made selective concessions—concerning for example 
certain cases of abortion, contraception or in vitro fertilisation. However, in these cases, he 
                                                 
75  Ibid.: 25. 
76  With these words, Janice Boddy’s describes the motivation of women for supporting female genital 
cutting in colonial Sudan. BODDY 2007: 288. 
77  There is a strong parallel here to early reformist writings on gender segregation and veiling from Qāsim 
Amīn in his Taḥrīr al-Marʾa first published in 1899 (AMĪN n.d.: esp. 69-119).  
78  See for example al-QARAḌĀWĪ 2004. For an inner-Islamic critical appraisal of the development of al-
Qaraḍāwī’s thought on women’s rights see ʿIZZAT 1999.  
79  This concept has been developed by Deniz Kandiyoti in order to explain the active support of patriar-
chal structures by women. See KANDIYOTI 1988. 
80  There exist an increasing number of studies on the topic that cannot be mentioned here in their entirety. 
For an overview of the history of Islamic Feminism see MOGHADAM 2002 and LATTE ABDALLAH 
2010. For international activities deployed in this field see BADRAN 2013. For a critical feminist ap-
praisal viewed from the Arab region see QARĀMĪ 2012.  
81  See <http://www.aljazeera.net/programs/religionandlife/2008/6/18/> (accessed 28 June 2017).  
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all the more firmly defends what he defines as the core value of Islam, i.e. heteronormative 
marriage and the family. This is particularly clear from his position on female genital muti-
lation or, in his own words, female genital cutting (ḫitān al-ināṯ) as expressed in a booklet 
on the topic published in 2007.82 The background to this publication was once more an 
international conference organised in 2006 at al-Azhar under the auspices of the Egyptian 
Minister of Religious Affairs, Maḥmūd Ḥamdī Zaqzūq, entitled ‘Towards Abolishing the 
Violation of the Female Body’ (Naḥwa ḥaẓr intihāk ǧasad al-marʾa). The conference was 
intended to back recent legal amendments on this highly contested issue that had been 
politicised since the 1990s.83 In his booklet, al-Qaraḍāwī actually makes only slight con-
cessions compared to earlier statements on the topic. Far from approving legal prohibition 
he concedes that, from an Islamic legal perspective, there are no irrefutable objections to 
prohibiting female genital cutting—even if he himself declares other methods like con-
scious rising more commendable for encouraging change. More importantly, al-Qaraḍāwī 
persistently frames the problem of female genital cutting as one of sexual morals and pub-
lic health—thus deliberately omitting rights based approaches. He bases his arguments on 
Islamic law, more particularly on the notion of ‘public interest’ (maṣlaḥa ʿāmma) to raise 
questions of health and social change.  
Al-Qaraḍāwī’s treatment of homosexuality, or, in his words, sexual deviance (šuḏūḏ), 
follows the same overall logic of sacralising and naturalising the conjugal generativity. 
Anti-homosexual arguments further help to categorically separate the sphere of intimacy 
and sexuality confined to the legitimate Islamic family from the realm of secular legal 
rights. At the same time, arguments about homosexuality are again intrinsically linked to 
questions of religious authority. Condemning šuḏūḏ, al-Qaraḍāwī simultaneously defends 
his pretense to controlling the interpretation Islamic law. Already the definition of homo-
sexuality raises theological questions and hence possibly opens new spaces for competing 
forms of inner-Muslim politicisation of gender and sexuality. Al-Qaraḍāwī therefore cate-
gorically objects to any kind of accommodation of homosexuality based on (liberal) reli-
gious or biological determinism.  
In an article analyzing al-Qaraḍāwī’s view on homosexuality, Scott Kugle and Stephen 
Hunt argue that Islamic ‘neo-traditionalist’ homophobia is actually the expression of a 
perceived crisis of Muslim masculinity—with non-heterosexuality being seen as a threat to 
masculine identity and authority.84  According to Kugle and Hunt, al-Qaraḍāwī defines 
homosexuality as sinful desire of individual Muslims and as a perversion that is part of a 
threat against Islam and social order inspired by the West. In equating the innate disposition 
to believe in God (enshrined in the semantics of the Arabic word fiṭra) with an inborn het-
erosexual orientation, al-Qaraḍāwī, according to the authors, at least implicitly equates 
                                                 
82  al-QARAḌĀWĪ 2007. In transnational feminist circles, the wording of Female Genital Mutilation 
(FGM) or Female Genital Cutting (FGC) is contested (see for example MERRY 2009: esp. 127 ff.). 
While Egyptian women’s rights activists and state led campaigns usually employ FGM, official docu-
ments and Islamic legal scholars use FGC or ḫitān. For the respective debates and campaigns in Egypt 
see TOLINO 2010. 
83  For the background to this see TOLINO 2010. For women’s rights activism in this field see Al-ALI 
2000.  
84  KUGLE & HUNT 2012. 
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homosexuality with unbelief. As far as Islamic tradition is concerned, the authors rightly 
stress that, contrary to the existing sources, al-Qaraḍāwī states that the sharia is clear and 
univocal, excluding from discussion any of the documented differences in opinion let alone 
alternative contemporary readings of sacred sources. At the same time, according to the 
authors, al-Qaraḍāwī ‘misunderstands and distorts’ the basic concept of ‘sexual orienta-
tion’—thus referring to a term employed by Muslim gay activists who claim theological 
recognition for their sexual inclination.85 The source Kugle and Hunt are analyzing is again 
an emission of the TV program al-Šarīʿa wa’l-ḥayāh broadcasted on Al Jazeera on June 7, 
2006, under the title of ‘Innate human nature’ (fiṭra).86 As usual, it is the host of the pro-
gram, ʿAbd al-Ṣamad Nāṣir, who introduces the key terms for discussing the topic alter-
nately labeled in Arabic as homosexuality (miṯliyya) or deviance (šuḏūḏ). These terms are: 
fiṭra, Islam, Islamic law, human rights as well as relevant psychological classification.  
In general, during the emission, al-Qaraḍāwī advances rather predictable neo-con-
servative positions on the topic. He repeatedly states that innate human nature (fiṭra) as 
such is heterosexual and that therefore there cannot subsist any truly natural inclination or 
predisposition for being attracted to persons of the same sex. Al-Qaraḍāwī continuously 
slips from the Quranic terminology of fiṭra to the notion of nature tout court (ṭabīʿa) with 
the familiar biologistic connotations attached to it when he refers, for instance, to the make-
up of the reproductive apparatus (ǧihāz tanāsulī) of men and women as a proof to the bina-
ry gender order and heterosexual attraction as fundamentals of human existence. According 
to al-Qaraḍāwī, homosexuality does not only contradict innate human nature but also jeop-
ardises the common interest (maṣlaḥa). Acceptance of homosexuality in al-Qaraḍāwī’s 
view inevitably leads to decadence and finally to the extinction of mankind altogether. 
Asked about the Islamic legal sanction for homosexuality, al-Qaraḍāwī classifies it as illicit 
sexual intercourse (zinā)—irrespective of the complexities of classificatory systems in 
traditional Islamic law.87 Given the differences between the Sunni schools of law with 
regard to the concrete form and degree of punishment, al-Qaraḍāwī nevertheless recom-
mends to dispense with mildness when choosing from them. Without further explication he 
asserts that female homosexuality (siḥāq) is to be punished less harsh than male homosex-
uality (liwāṭ).88 Concerning homosexuals who repent and seek to overcome their ‘degener-
ate’ sexual inclination, al-Qaraḍāwī suggests offering help and assures his listeners of the 
clemency of ‘us Muslims’. On the other hand, he insists on the especially reprehensible 
character of publicly exposing or propagating same-sex-relationships. 
                                                 
85  Ibid.: 278. 
86  See <http://www.aljazeera.net/programs/religionandlife/2006/6/7/> (accessed 28 June 2017). 
87  On differences in the treatment of homosexual acts in traditional law see for example ALI 2006: 73 ff. 
On contemporary fatāwā see TOLINO 2016. 
88  Literally siḥāq refers only to the same-sex act between women (tribadism), while liwāṭ literally refers 
to the anal intercourse, but from the context it seems that al-Qaraḍāwī is referring not only to the sexual 
act. 
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5. Conclusions 
Given the central role played by marriage and heteronormative generativity in foundation-
alist arguments for and competition over religious authority, there is no room in al-
Qaraḍāwī’s version of neo-conservative Islamic discourse for conceiving of and recognis-
ing sexual rights. In his writings, al-Qaraḍāwī systematically treats the topic of homosexu-
ality in connection with the central theme of his program of wasaṭiyya gravitating around 
the legitimate ‘Islamic’ family which actually proves to be a hybrid of national state sanc-
tioned familism and a decontextualised ideal of sexual difference as an eternal ‘cosmic’ 
principle. Actually, while contributing itself to their politicisation, Islamic discourse con-
structs both family and sexuality as lying beyond the reach of (secular) politics. Naturalised 
and sacralised notions of marriage and sexuality thereby warrant a legitimate realm for 
religious authority to rise to legitimately speak in public. At the same time, Islamic dis-
course continuously and variously reconfigures the functionality of marriage and the family 
in reaction to changing social and political demands.  
The opinions expressed by al-Qaraḍāwī in each of the cases discussed above, in spite of 
their adaptive pragmatism, all converge to foster the empowerment of religion to publicly 
claim authority over the realm of the private sphere, intimacy and sexuality. Seen from this 
angle, neo-conservative anti-homosexual attitudes are not necessarily and certainly not 
solely incited by transnational LGBTQI activism in the region nor are they exclusively 
targeted at activist groups or individuals. Rather, there exists a specific historico-political 
context that generates particular forms of ideological investment of the heteronormative 
conjugal family. At the same time, al-Qaraḍāwī’s attitude on homosexuality as formulated 
during the respective TV emission analyzed above is not completely incompatible with 
what Kecia Ali has described as a ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ policy of more compliant Islamic 
positions.89 These kinds of connected yet shifting ideological fault lines do not allow for 
easy generalisations on Islam and homosexuality. 
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